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Abstract 
The United States Supreme Court is increasingly forsaking its role as legal interpreter for 
the role of legal author due to a transformation in Constitutional interpretation.  In 
interpreting the Constitution in a manner inconsistent with the original intent of the 
Constitution, the rule of law is circumvented.  In order to maintain a separation of powers 
necessary for governance according to rule of law principles, the U.S. Supreme Court 
must return to its correct role as interpreter of law.  The Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the Establishment Clause illustrates the current difficulties surrounding the lack of a 
standard of interpretation.  This thesis suggests that the only solution for the relative basis 
of Constitutional meaning is to abandon a relative view of the Constitution as a living 
document and to consider once again the original intent of the framers of the 
Constitution.   
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Through the Looking Glass of Constitutional Interpretation 
 The United States Supreme Court is increasingly forsaking its role as legal 
interpreter for the role of legal author due to a transformation in constitutional 
interpretation.  Because the Constitution is interpreted in a manner inconsistent with its 
original intent, the rule of law is circumvented.  In order to maintain a separation of 
powers necessary for governance according to rule of law principles, the U.S. Supreme 
Court must return to its correct role as interpreter of law. 
 Though the British system of government from which the Americans declared 
independence was based upon an unwritten system of Common Law, the United States of 
America would be built upon a different foundation — a written constitution.  The U.S. 
Constitution would serve as the legal foundation of American government.  While few, if 
any, will deny that America's Constitution is in fact the supreme law of the land, many 
will debate exactly what that supreme law means.   
 This thesis addresses the meaning of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court.  Section II will compare interpretivist and noninterpretivist methods of 
adjudication such as textualism, originalism, modernism, and pragmatism.  Section III 
will briefly review the history of constitutional interpretation.  Section IV will examine 
how the current High Court is slowly removing America from her shelter of protection 
under the rule of law by increasingly interpreting the U.S. Constitution apart from its 
original design.  In order to examine this changing interpretation, Section IV will provide 
an in depth analysis of the difficulties created by the High Court's transformation of the 
Establishment Clause's meaning and present various interpretations of that clause.  
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Finally, Section V will consider the interpretative method of originalism as a remedy for 
the relativity pervading constitutional adjudication in America today.  
Different Methods of Interpretation 
 While there are numerous approaches that judges may take when interpreting the 
U.S. Constitution, there are primarily two categories of constitutional interpretation.  One 
constitutional law text describes these two differing approaches as interpretivism and 
noninterpretivism.
1
  These categories divide judges based upon their view of the 
Constitution as static or evolutionary in nature.
2
  This section will examine both 
approaches, including some of the benefits and difficulties of each method. 
Interpretivist Approaches 
 Interpretivists argue either that the text of the Constitution itself and/or the 
original intent of its authors should serve as the sole authority in constitutional 
interpretation.
3
  Interpretivists hold that judges may not exceed the limits of the text and 
its intention when discovering its meaning.
4
  Interpretivists fall into primarily one of two 
categories: textualists or originalists.
5
  A third but rather uncommon category of 
interpretivists focuses upon the principles enshrined in the Constitution rather than 
strictly the text or the original intent.
6
 
                                                 
1
 Otis H. Stevens, Jr. & John M. Scheb II, American Constitutional Law: Sources of 
Power and Restraint 48-9 (2008). 
2
 Id. 
3
 Gary L. McDowell, Interpretivism and Noninterpretivsm, in The Oxford Companion to 
the Supreme Court of the United States 436, 437 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992). 
4
 Id. at 436. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Steven D. Smith, What Does Constitutional Interpretation Interpret? in Expounding the 
Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory 21, 32 (Grant Huscroft ed., 2008). 
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Textualist approach.  One interpretivist approach to interpreting the U.S. 
Constitution is textualism, whereby the objective meaning of the words themselves in 
their historical context serves as the standard of interpretation.
7
  Textualists would hold 
that if a word's meaning within its historical context means A, even if the intention of the 
framer was B, A's meaning should prevail.
8
  So, if a letter was discovered detailing the 
intention of one of the Constitution's drafters, that intention would be irrelevant to the 
textualist who is only concerned with the historically consistent meaning of the words 
themselves.
9
  Occasionally, textualists will consider other outside sources in order to 
"scope out common patterns of word usage in earlier historical periods."
10
  Additionally, 
textualists evaluate the overall constitutional structure in order to discern the meaning of 
the passage.
11
  However, there is no consensus embracing textual meaning as the 
legitimate source of constitutional interpretation.
12
  Furthermore, simply considering the 
text of the Constitution alone rarely provides sufficient answers to difficult cases that 
reach the Supreme Court.
13
  In order to solve most judicial questions, something else 
must be considered beyond the text.
14
 
                                                 
7
 Id. at 27. 
8
 Id. 
9
 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 144 
(1990). 
10
 Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Judgment Calls: Principles and Politics in 
Constitutional Law 28 (2009). 
11
 Id. 
12
 Antonin Scalia, Review of Steven D. Smith's Law's Quandary, 55 Cath. U.L. Rev. 687, 
692-3 (2006). 
13
 Christopher N. May & Allan Ides, Constitutional Law National Power and Federalism: 
Examples And Explanations 36 (2007). 
14
 Id. 
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 Originalist approach. The interpretivist method of originalism is similar to 
textualism in that it focuses upon the actual text of the Constitution.  However, 
originalists also consider the historical meaning of the Constitution in order to discover 
the meaning of its words. 
15
  The principles that the drafters of the Constitution included 
in that text also serve as a source of consideration.
16
  Moreover, those holding to an 
originalist interpretivist approach place a value upon historical documents delineating the 
drafters' understanding of its meaning.
17
  According to Associate Supreme Court Justice 
Antonin Scalia, "It is essential to originalism, as it is not to so-called ‘evolutionary 
constitutional jurisprudence,’ to know the original meaning of constitutional 
provisions."
18
  Originalism, simply put, seeks to discover what the original authors of the 
Constitution intended when they penned it.
19
 
 Originalism finds its strength in its proposed objectivity as well as security under 
the rule of law that it affords.
20
  However, one of the problems that opponents of 
originalism often raise is the difficulty of knowing the actual intent of the founders.
21
  
Nonetheless, by consulting the numerous writings of the founders and their early 
                                                 
15
 Farber, supra note 10, at 27. 
16
 Keith Whittington, How to Read the Constitution: Self-Government and the 
Jurisprudence of Originalism (2006), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/how-to-
read-the-constitution-self-government-and-the-jurisprudence-of-originalism. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Antonin Scalia, Scalia Defends Originalism as Best Methodology for Judging Law 
(April 30, 2010), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2010_spr/scalia.htm 
19
 Steven G. Calabresi, Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate 152 (2007).  
20
 Id. 
21
 Alan Brownstein, The Reasons Why Originalism Provides a Weak Foundation for 
Interpreting Constitutional Provisions Relating to Religion, 2009 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 196, 
216 (2009). 
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constitutional convention debates, the question of what they intended can be properly 
ascertained.
22
  Additionally, some critics of originalism assert that its judicial proponents 
are not consistent in applying original intent to decisions they make.
23
  Steven Smith 
states, "Even committed 'originalists' may concede that [free] speech decisions cannot or 
should not rest on interpretations of original intentions or understandings."
24
  Therefore, 
these critics argue, originalism is not a coherent doctrine consistently held by those who 
espouse it.  However, such an argument does not address the validity of the approach; it 
simply criticizes adherents of the originalist approach. 
 One of the preeminent problems with the originalist approach is, according to its 
critics, that "the modern scope of judicial review is rigorously circumscribed by original 
intentionalism because the eighteenth-century framers had few, if any, clear intentions 
about our twentieth century problems."
25
  Such skeptics ask whether changed conditions 
should not demand a different understanding of constitutional principles.
26
  Nevertheless, 
originalism does not require asking "what would Madison do in such a situation, or even 
what did Madison do in such a situation, but what does the principle that Madison and his 
fellows wrote into the Constitution require in such a situation."
27
  Thus, as originalist 
Robert Bork has argued, even though the framers of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition 
                                                 
22
 David Barton, Original Intent: The Courts, the Constitution, & Religion 21 (1996). 
23
Brownstein, supra note 21, at 216. 
24
 Smith, supra note 6, at 27. 
25
 Phillip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution, 94 (3) Ethics 501, 502 
(1984). 
26
 Brownstein, supra note 21, at 216. 
27
 Id. (emphasis added). 
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of unreasonable searches and seizures could not have had electronic eavesdropping in 
mind, the prohibition logically extends that far.
28
    
 Further, Smith proposes that while considering original intent as a valid normative 
interpretive approach, it is not a descriptive presentation of how judges currently interpret 
the Constitution.  Smith concludes, "Whatever its virtues or deficiencies, the enactors' 
intentions answer cannot provide a satisfactory overall descriptive account of 
constitutional interpretation as we know it and practice it."
29
  Though this paper does not 
suggest that originalism provides a descriptive account of the current method utilized by 
the majority of Supreme Court Justices, it does suggest that originalism provides a valid 
alternative to the current methods utilized by the Court.  In conclusion, while there are 
some difficulties in practically applying the originalist method, originalism offers an 
objective approach to interpreting the Constitution. 
 Constitutional principles approach.  Finally, the last method in the category of 
interpretivist approaches is one that takes into consideration the principles embodied in 
the Constitution.  However, this method of interpretation, while appealing, requires 
knowledge of the complicated process of identifying and interpreting the principles 
enshrined in the text of the Constitution.
30
  Proponents of the 'Constitution-as-principles' 
position contend that the object of constitutional interpretation is the identification of 
some set of political-moral facts that the Constitution somehow references.
31
  The 
principles approach is an attractive one, as most individuals favor prioritizing virtues 
                                                 
28
 McDowell, supra note 3, at 437. 
29
 Smith, supra note 6, at 27 (emphasis added). 
30
 Id. at 29. 
31
 Id. at 30. 
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such as goodness, justice, or morality.
32
  Once again, the same difficulties that arise with 
the methods of textualism and originalism arise with the principles approach — how does 
one know what principles are in fact a legitimate bases for interpreting the Constitution?  
There seems to be no consensus among judges as to which principles are proper to use as 
an interpretive basis.  The principles method is another standard that is more of a reform 
proposal than a descriptive explanation of what is actually happening in the arena of 
constitutional interpretation.
33
  Many individuals do not hold to one view exclusively.  
Occasionally, numerous readings or a hybrid reading can be seen even within one judicial 
opinion. 
Noninterpretivist Approaches 
 In addition to these preceding interpretivist methods of adjudication, there are a 
few methods characterized as noninterpretivist, two of which are instrumentalism and 
pragmatism.
34
  The difference between these noninterpretivist approaches lies in their 
reliance upon the intentions of the founders as justification. 
 Modernist approach.  Modernists, also called instrumentalists, claim that the 
intent of the framers of the Constitution actually necessitates a noninterpretivist 
approach.
35
   Modernists suggest that the authors of the U.S. Constitution were 
deliberately vague, with no declaration of how judges should interpret it, and who are 
therefore free to engage the document in accordance with the changing necessities of 
                                                 
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. at 32. 
34
 McDowell, supra note 3, at 437. 
35
 Edward Sidlow & Beth Henschen, America at Odds 337 (2007). 
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time.
36
  Thomas Jefferson could be seen as endorsing a sort of modernism when he 
stated:  
I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and 
constitutions . . . But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand 
with the progress of the human mind.  As that becomes more developed, more 
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered, and manners 
and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance 
also, and keep pace with the times . . .
37
 
 
Hence, modernists, or instrumentalists, treat the Constitution as a living document that 
adapts to the changing needs of society and interpret it as if it were ratified today.
38
 
 Pragmatic approach.  Pragmatists, on the other hand, do not rely upon the 
intention of the framers to justify their noninterpretive approach.
39
  They claim that the 
changing needs of society require flexible interpretations informed by precedent, statutes, 
and the Constitution rather than upon the intention of the Constitution's authors.
40
  
Numerous Supreme Court Justices fall within the category of "pragmatists," including 
Holmes, Brandeis, Frankfurter, Jackson, Douglas, Brennan, Powell, Stevens, White, and 
                                                 
36
 Id. 
37
 Gottfried Dietze, In Defense of Property 258 (1995). 
38
 R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and 
Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 25 Pepp. L. Rev. 37, 57 (1997).  Trop v. 
Dulles provides a great illustration of an instrumentalist reading of the Constitution.  In Trop v. 
Dulles, then Chief Justice Warren established what would become a dominant basis for future 
Supreme Court decisions.  In the case, Justice Warren made the bold declaration in reference to 
the Eighth Amendment, "The [Constitutional] Amendment must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."  Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  Chief Justice Warren's decision to declare a constitutional Amendment 
bound to the changing preferences of society set the Court upon a dangerous trail leading even 
farther away from the original meaning of the Constitution.  
39
 Robert Justin Lipkin, Constitutional Revolutions: Pragmatism and the Role of Judicial 
Review in American Constitutionalism 126-7 (2000). 
40
 Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 5 (1996). 
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now Breyer.
41
  Nevertheless, without reference to the text or the intentions of the framers, 
the only source of interpretive justification is precedent.  Some of these judges, including 
the renowned judge Richard Posner, however, do not even believe that it is necessary to 
rely upon precedent; rather, these "pragmatist" judges simply ask the question of results: 
what decision will bring about the most good in society or promote stability?
42
  Thus, the 
pragmatist noninterpretivists have no final standard other than utilitarianism with which 
to legitimize their decisions. 
 Consequences of utilizing a noninterpretivist approach.  Despite the 
differences among the various noninterpretivist approaches, noninterpretivist adherents 
are united by their rejection of interpretivists' claim that "noninterpretivism would either 
require or permit courts to ignore the written Constitution and its authoritative effect."
43
  
However, Michael Perry, a noninterpretivist, concludes that decisions reached utilizing 
such an approach have "no plausible textual or historical justification."
44
  Perry further 
acknowledges that there is "no way to avoid the conclusion that noninterpretive review, 
whether state or federal action, cannot be justified by reference either to the text or to the 
intentions of the framers of the Constitution."
45
  Without reference to the text itself or the 
intentions of the framers, noninterpretivists must rely upon their own judgment as to what 
                                                 
41
 Id.at 2. 
42
 Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 593, 596 
(1999); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1998). 
43
 Richard B. Saphire, Making Noninterpretivism Respectable: Michael J. Perry's 
Contributions to Constitutional Theory, 81 (4) Mich. Law Rev. 782, 785 (1983). 
44
 Michael J. Perry,The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the 
Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary 11 (1982). 
45
 Id. at 24. 
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the changing demands of society require.  Oliver Wendell Holmes summarizes the 
noninterpretivist method: 
The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience.  The felt necessities 
of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, 
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices judges share with their fellow-men 
have a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which 
men should be governed.
46
  
  
Therefore, by reinterpreting the Constitution in a manner that changes its meaning rather 
than following the established process for amending the Constitution, noninterpretivists 
render the Court a continuing constitutional convention. 
History of Constitutional Interpretation 
 In order to understand what the drafters of the Constitution actually intended 
when they penned the supreme law of the land, one must first determine whose intentions 
should be included in such an analysis and what their intentions actually were.
47
  The 
intentions of the convention delegates who ratified the Constitution must be considered.
48
  
The opinions of those who influenced the drafters of the Constitution and the interpretive 
positions of the early Supreme Court should be considered as well.  This section will 
provide a brief summary of such a history of constitutional interpretation.  Following this 
is an examination of the major changes in the Supreme Court's method of constitutional 
interpretation. 
                                                 
46
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881). 
47
 William Anderson, The Intention of the Framers: A Note on Constitutional 
Interpretation, Vol, 49, No. 2 The American Political Science Review 340, 342 (1955). 
48
 Id. 
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Early Intentions 
 For centuries, judicial decision-making simply relied upon interpreting the law.  
Robin West asserted, "That adjudication consists primarily of the interpretation of texts is 
a very old claim — its roots lie in Blackstone's insistence that adjudication is primarily 
the discovery, not the creation of law."
49
  According to Blackstone,
50
 the spirit and reason 
of the law must be taken into consideration when applying debatable law to particular 
cases: "But, lastly, the most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning 
of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it; or the 
cause which moved the legislator to enact it. For when this reason ceases, the laws itself 
ought likewise to cease with it."
51
  It is significant that Blackstone held firmly to the 
belief that adjudication requires interpretation in light of the motivation of the law's 
author because:  
It was from Blackstone that most Americans, including John Marshall, acquired their 
knowledge of natural law . . . Blackstone remained the standard manual of law until the 
publication of the Commentaries on American Law (1826-1830) of Chancellor James 
Kent of New York..
52
   
                                                 
49
 Robin L. West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About The 
Law-As-Literature Movement, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 203, 205 (1986). 
50
 Many consider Blackstone's Commentaries the best exposition of English Common 
Law.  James McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice: An Introduction to the Constitutional 
Principles of American Government 33 (2000).  Constitutional scholar Donald Lutz stated that, 
"A trenchant reference to Blackstone could quickly end an argument."  Donald Lutz, The Relative 
Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought 78 The 
American Political Science Review 189, 196 (1984).   
51
 William Blackstone, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England 61 (1765), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_intro.asp#1. 
52
 Robert K. Dorman & Csaba Vedlick Jr., Judicial Supremacy: The Supreme Court on 
Trial 10 (1986). 
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Blackstone was so influential in America that Edmund Burke stated, "They have sold as 
many of Blackstone's Commentaries in America as in England."
53
  If Blackstone, the 
legal authority during the time of the Constitution's formulation, asserted that 
adjudication relies upon interpreting legal texts in light of the intention of the text's 
author, it is reasonable to presume that the drafters of the Constitution, being highly 
influenced by Blackstone, held to a similar belief.
54
 
 Throughout the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence, interpretation of the 
law was presumed to be the legitimate province of judges.  However, with the creation of 
the United States Constitution in 1787, a new type of law appeared on the scene of 
history –– a written constitution.  Beginning with the Mayflower Compact (1620) and the 
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1639), both states as well as the federal government 
would establish a form of government based upon written laws that would serve to 
govern both rulers and those ruled.  America's unique rule of law tradition, built upon 
British charters such as the Magna Carta (1215) and the English Bill of Rights (1689), 
would serve as a subsequent model for the rest of the world.  Today, written constitutions 
epitomize what it means to be an independent state in the contemporary world.
55
 
                                                 
53
 Barton, supra note 22, at 216. 
54
 According to Donald Lutz's analysis of European writers upon Americans during the 
founding era, "Blackstone is the second most prominent secular writer [cited] during the founding 
era."  Donald Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century 
American Political Thought 78 The American Political Science Review 189, 193 (1984).  Most of 
the delegates to the Convention were well versed in English Common Law, and their legal 
perspectives were highly influenced by English Common Law.  James McClellan, Liberty, Order, 
and Justice: An Introduction to the Constitutional Principles of American Government 32-33 
(2000). 
55
 Martin Edelman, Issues Facing The Judiciary: Written Constitutions, Democracy And 
Judicial Interpretation: The Hobgoblin Of Judicial Activism, 68 Alb. L. Rev. 585, 586 (2005). 
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 While the founders of the United States would have the benefit of the writings of 
men such as Blackstone, they would not model government strictly after any other 
system.  Instead, they would create a government wholly unique — built upon a written 
Constitution.  In May 1787, the Constitutional Convention met in order to draft what 
would become the Constitution of the United States of America, which incorporated the 
intentions of the fifty-five men who constituted the Convention and, later, ninety more 
who debated the Bill of Rights.
56
  The writings of these men are highly informative 
relative to this discussion on constitutional interpretation.    
 In order to ensure the government of the United States would remain within its 
jurisdiction, the founders created a written Constitution.  James Madison, known as the 
father of the Constitution, stated the following:  
What is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If 
men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern 
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the 
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has 
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
57
   
 
Regarding the importance of a written constitution and its construction, Thomas Jefferson 
reflected, "I had rather ask an enlargement of power from the nation, where it is found 
necessary, than to assume it by a construction which would make our powers boundless.  
Our particular security is in a written Constitution.  Let us not make it a blank paper by 
                                                 
56
 Barton, supra note 22, at 6. 
57
 James Madison, The Federalist No. 51 319-20 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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construction."
58
  Evidenced by the preceding historical accounts, early influential 
Americans perceived the construction of America's written Constitution as involving a 
certain amount of governmental restraint.   
 If a written constitution is to serve the function of keeping government within its 
lawful bounds, then there must be some check to guarantee that the government is 
actually obeying the law.  As Chief Justice Marshall enunciated in 1803 shortly after the 
creation of the U.S. Constitution, "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what law is."
59
  Prior to the monumental decision of Marbury v. 
Madison, the judicial branch had not exercised the function of judicial review.  
Nevertheless, Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist 78 in 1788, only one year after the 
Constitution's drafting, enunciated: 
It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend to enable the 
representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constituents. It 
is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate 
body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep 
the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the 
laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, 
and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It, therefore, belongs to 
them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act 
proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an 
irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation 
and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution 
ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of 
their agents. 
60
 
 
                                                 
58
 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Wilson C. Nicholas, in Thomas Jefferson: Letters and 
Addresses 154, 154 (William B. Parker and Jonas Viles eds., 1908). 
59
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
60
 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78: The Judiciary (1788), 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa78.htm 
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Thus, the drafters of the Constitution, or at the very least certain drafters, foresaw the role 
of the judicial branch as interpreting the Constitution and statutes, and preferring the 
former when in conflict with the latter.   
Early Interpretive Approach Utilized by the Supreme Court 
 In addition to perspectives of European legal scholars such as Blackstone on 
constitutional interpretation, the early Supreme Court justices' perspectives on 
constitutional interpretation provide further evidence as to the method of interpretation 
envisioned by the drafters of the U.S. Constitution.  The early Court's approach was 
presumably influenced by the founders' own perspective on constitutional interpretation.  
Justice Felix Frankfurter summarized the early Court's approach in Wallace v. Jaffree: 
"What governs is the Constitution, and not what we have written about it."
61
  The case of 
Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) also illustrates the early Supreme Court's rationale, which 
relied upon the original intent of the drafters.  In reaching their decision, Justice Iredell,
62
 
deliberated, "The framers of the Constitution, I presume, must have meant one of two 
things . . ."
63
  Such commentary indicates how some of the first Supreme Court justices 
viewed the intention of the founders as extremely relevant in determining the meaning 
and application of the law to the cases at hand.    
 Another early Supreme Court decision that relied upon the intention of the 
founders in its rationale is the Church of the Holy Trinity v. U.S. decision.  In this case, a 
                                                 
61
 John Eidsmoe, Christianity and the Constitution 397 (1987), quoting Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, Wallace v. Jaffree 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
62
 Justice James Iredell of North Carolina was a prominent American lawyer who 
received his legal education in England; Iredell was also a delegate to the Federal Convention.  
James McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice: An Introduction to the Constitutional Principles of 
American Government 33 (2000). 
63
 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 432 (1793). 
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church in New York was being prosecuted for violating a statute enacted for the purpose 
of preventing the importation of foreign labor to build western railroads.  The church was 
accused of violating the law by hiring an English clergyman.  The Court, however, 
reasoned: 
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and not 
within the statute, because not within its spirit, not within the intention of its 
makers . . . Frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words 
broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole 
legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd 
results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it 
unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.
64
 
 
Thus, the Court in the Holy Trinity case relied heavily upon the intention of the legislator 
in reaching its decision.   
Similarly, in Marbury v. Madison, which established the legitimacy of judicial 
review, Chief Justice Marshall clearly relies upon a textual or historical basis of 
constitutional interpretation as the basis for judicial review: 
'No person,' says the constitution, 'shall be convicted of treason unless on the 
testimony of two witnesses to the fame overt act, or on confession in open court.'  
Here the language of the constitution is addressed especially to the courts. It 
prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be departed from. If the 
legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of 
court, sufficient for conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the 
legislative act?  From these, and many other selections which might be made, it is 
apparent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument, as a 
rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.
65
  
 
Marshall, in addition to the preceding cases, further demonstrates that the early Supreme 
Court relied upon the meaning of the Constitution's words as well as the intention of its 
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authors.  In short, while justices did not always claim to be certain of the intention of the 
Constitution's drafters, they did seek to discern their intent. 
Moving Away From Early Intentions 
 The court did not embrace any idea of "living constitutionalism" until much later 
in U.S. history.
66
  It was not until the prevailing positivism of the 1870s when 
Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced the case-law study method that constitutional 
adjudication began to markedly change.
67
  This new approach focused upon judicial 
decisions rather than the Constitution itself.
68
  The case-law approach viewed the 
intentions of the founders as irrelevant and even a hindrance to the "successful evolution 
of society."
69
   
 Numerous legal theorists throughout the 1900s began espousing similar views of 
legal positivism.
70
  John Dewey, a leading relativist of the time, clearly articulates the 
change in legal philosophy from Blackstone's traditional approach to Langdell's positivist 
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approach, "The belief in political fixity, of the sanctity of some form of state consecrated 
by the efforts of our fathers and hallowed by tradition, is one of the stumbling-blocks in 
the way of orderly and directed change."
71
  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
72
 echoed a similar 
pronouncement in 1902: "The justification of a law for us cannot be found in the fact that 
our fathers always have followed it.  It must be found in some help which the law brings 
toward reaching a social end."
73
  The scientific approach to the law brought with it a 
sense that the law should change with the evolving needs of society. 
 The influence of positivist philosophy increased following Langdell's case-law 
method, and positivist philosophy continues to inspire legal theorists to this day.  Justice 
Cardozo stated in 1921, "I take judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life."
74
  
Additionally, Justice Charles Evans Hughes emphatically stated, "We are under a 
Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judge says it is."
75
  This changing 
perspective of constitutional adjudication began to influence not only the thinking of 
legal scholars, but the methods of judicial decision-making in America's courts. 
 It was not until 1958 that such evolutionary legal reasoning would make its way 
into a U.S. Supreme Court case.  That case was Trop v. Dulles, which declared it "cruel 
                                                 
71
 John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 34 (1927). 
72
 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. served as associate Justice to the U.S. Supreme Court from 
1902 until 1932.  Holmes also served as an Associate Justice and as Chief Justice on the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.  Additionally, he was a law professor at Harvard.  Sophie 
W. Littlefield & William M. Wiecek, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.: The Supreme Court and 
American Legal Thought 5 (2005). 
73
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Law in Science--Science in Law, in Collected Legal 
Papers 225, 225 (1920). 
74
 Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 10 (1921). 
75
 Charles Evans Hughes, Speech at Elmira on May 3, 1907, in The Autobiographical 
Notes of Charles Evans Hughes 144 (1973). 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION                                                                      22 
 
and unusual punishment" to revoke the citizenship of a U.S. citizen as a form of 
punishment.
76
  In Trop v. Dulles, then Chief Justice Warren established what would 
become a dominant basis for future Supreme Court decisions by boldly declaring that the 
Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society."
77
  Chief Justice Warren's decision to declare a 
Constitutional Amendment bound to the changing preferences of society set the Court 
upon a dangerous path leading even farther away from the original meaning of the 
Constitution. 
 Today, the Supreme Court has shifted even farther from the original 
understanding of the Constitution by discovering in the "emanations of the penumbras of 
the Constitution" everything from a Constitutional right to privacy
78
 to a right to pursue 
an occupation.
79
  Such rights, while not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution are, 
according to Justice Douglas, necessary in order to give substance to the rights 
enumerated.  Douglas asserts, "The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that 
help give them life and substance."
80
  In sum, the Court's reasoning not only relies upon 
the specific enumeration of rights in the Constitution but also upon whatever additional 
rights the Justices deem necessary to grant those enumerated rights "life and substance."
81
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 The next section of this paper will examine one specific example where the result 
of interpreting the Constitution without a standard has created conflicting law.  This 
example illustrates the current need for an established standard of interpretation to ensure 
that the law provides stability and certainty for those who live under its authority. 
Interpreting Without a Standard: Separation of Church and State 
 Recently, a school in Giles County, VA received a letter from an attorney 
informing them that their display of the Ten Commandments is unconstitutional and 
urging the school to remove their "unconstitutional" display.
82
  The school board 
promptly removed the display of the Ten Commandments.
83
  However, negative 
responses from concerned parents eventually prompted the school board to return the Ten 
Commandments to their original place in the school.
84
  This is just one example 
illustrating the difficulty of constitutional interpretation.  One side was adamant that the 
display was unconstitutional, while the other, with equal vehemence, declared the display 
wholly constitutional.  Nonetheless, the Constitution does not explicitly address the 
question of religious displays in public schools.  In order to make a judgment regarding 
the question of such displays, the Supreme Court must interpret the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment.   
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 The First Amendment, states simply, "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ."
85
  Hence, in 
deciding a specific case involving a "separation of church and state" question, the court 
must ascertain the meaning and legal application of the Establishment Clause.  The 
difficulties with the Supreme Court's doctrine of "separation of church and state" clearly 
present the need for an interpretive standard.  In order to examine the current difficulties 
surrounding the lack of such a standard, this section will examine the original intent of 
the Establishment Clause and how the Court initially interpreted it, followed by an 
examination of the Court's changing interpretations of the Clause based upon 
contradictory standards and conflicting judgments.  Lastly, this section will examine the 
current Establishment Clause confusion created and the conflicting results reached due to 
an absent standard of interpretation. 
The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause 
 The case that first introduced the phrase "separation of church and state" into the 
rhetoric of the Supreme Court was the 1947 Everson v. Board of Education case.
86
  In 
this case, the Court emphatically declared, "The First Amendment has erected a wall 
between church and state.  That wall must be kept high and impregnable.  We could not 
approve the slightest breach."
87
  Yet, the phrase "separation of church and state" is found 
nowhere in the Constitution.  Whether the original intent of the Establishment Clause was 
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to "erect a wall between church and state" can be ascertained by examining documents 
and debates written during the Constitution's construction and adoption.     
 First, the original purpose of the Bill of Rights should inform any understanding 
of the original intent of the Establishment Clause.  The Bill of Rights was essentially a 
concession to certain anti-federalists who were wary of adopting the Constitution.
88
  The 
anti-federalists feared that the national government would become so powerful that it 
would interfere with the people's free exercise of religion; the Bill of rights was never 
originally intended to be directed against the states.
89
  The Establishment Clause 
specifically states that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ."
90
  The fact that seven states had 
established religions at the time the Constitution was adopted further evidences the 
assertion that it was Congress' authority — and not the states’ authority — that was 
directly limited by the Establishment Clause.
91
   
 Second, the intention of the Establishment Clause was to promote the Free 
Exercise Clause, not hinder it.
92
  The intention of the Establishment Clause was not to 
prevent the national government from interfering in religious affairs entirely, as there are 
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numerous early examples of the government even "promoting" theism specifically.
93
  The 
Establishment Clause, along with the Free Exercise Clause, was intended to promote 
liberty of conscience, a right that the founders of the United States of America valued 
highly.  James Madison, in his Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious 
Assessments (1785), asserted: 
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of 
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This 
right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of 
men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds cannot 
follow the dictates of other men.
94
  
 
Thomas Jefferson echoed a similar pronouncement:  
But our rulers can have no authority over such natural rights, only as we have 
submitted to them. The rights of conscience we never submitted, we could not 
submit. We are answerable for them to our God. The legitimate powers of 
government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no 
injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no God. It neither picks 
my pocket nor breaks my leg.
95
 
 
Another influential early American, Rector of Yale College Elisha Williams, stated 
regarding liberty of conscience, 
Every man has an equal right to follow the dictates of his own conscience in the 
affairs of religion. Every one is under an indispensable obligation to search the 
scripture for himself (which contains the whole of it) and to make the best use of 
it he can for his own information in the will of God, the nature and duties of 
Christianity. And as every Christian is so bound; so he has an unalienable right to 
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judge of the sense and meaning of it, and to follow his judgment wherever it leads 
him; even an equal right with any rulers be they civil or ecclesiastical.
96
  
 
Thus, the Establishment Clause was adopted to prevent Congress from instituting a 
national religion, and more broadly to prohibit the government from favoring or 
promoting one religion to the detriment of another which would have also violated liberty 
of conscience.
97
  The original understanding of the Establishment Clause encompassed 
principles of liberty of conscience, freedom of religious expression, religious pluralism 
and equality, and separation of church from state.
98
  Later interpretations of the 
Establishment Clause failed to consider its complete original understanding; rather, 
separation of church from state became the sole focus of Establishment Clause 
decisions.
99
 
The Current Meaning of the Establishment Clause 
 In recent decades, the Supreme Court has been interpreting the Establishment 
Clause in a manner inconsistent with and, in some cases, contrary to its original purpose.  
Such decisions resulted from shaky interpretative grounds.  For example, the Supreme 
Court ruled in Marsh v. Chambers that it is constitutional for chaplains in Congress to 
pray,100 while twenty-one years earlier in Engel v. Vitale the Court held that it is 
unconstitutional for students to recite similar prayers in schools.101  Moreover, in 1992 
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the Court decided that it was unconstitutional for students to hear prayers in public 
meetings.102  The Supreme Court held in 1984 that a crèche in a shopping center may 
constitutionally be displayed,103 but in 1989, the Court held that such a display of a 
crèche in a courthouse is unconstitutional.104   
 Additionally, the Court decided in Stone v. Graham that it was unconstitutional to 
display the Ten Commandments in schools, arguing that: "If the posted copies of the Ten 
Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce the schoolchildren to 
read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments."105  In Stone v. 
Graham the Court utilized the previously established Lemon test to determine whether 
the display was constitutional.106  The Court ruled that the display did not pass 
constitutional muster because it violated the first prong of the Lemon test, which requires 
statutes to have a "secular legislative purpose."107  The Court also declared in McCreary 
v. ACLU that the display of the Ten Commandments in the Kentucky County Courthouse 
was unconstitutional because the objective of the display was "predominantly 
religious,"108 and thus, failed to pass the secular legislative purpose prong of the Lemon 
test as well as the neutrality test instituted in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing.109   
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 However, the Court held in Van Orden v. Perry that the Ten Commandments 
could be constitutionally displayed on public property if the purpose of the display is 
based on its historical meaning and passive use.110  The Court concluded that the 
Establishment Clause requires "that we neither abdicate our responsibility to maintain a 
division between church and state nor evince a hostility to religion by disabling the 
government from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage."111  Van Orden 
declared in respect to the religious nature of the Commandments that, "Simply having 
religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run 
afoul of the Establishment Clause."112  Distinguishing the display in this case from the 
displays in public school settings in Stone, Schempp, and Engel, the Court held that the 
display in the legislative chamber was representative of Texas' legal and political history, 
and thus, not violative of the Establishment Clause.113   
 What can explain the Court's various interpretations of the Establishment Clause?  
Most certainly, the words of the Constitution and the original intent of men long deceased 
has not changed.  Therefore, the change must be a result of the changing interpretation of 
the Constitution's words.  As evidenced by the preceding cases, failure to base judicial 
decisions upon the original intent of the Constitution results in a Constitution whose 
meaning changes with each judge's relative perspective. 
 Based upon the preceding cases, it is clear why the Giles County School Board 
was uncertain as to the constitutionality of their display of the Ten Commandments.  
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Ultimately, there is precedent to support either side of the debate.  However, if the basis 
for the decision is the original intent of the Establishment Clause, the result is much more 
certain.  Ultimately, basing such constitutional decisions upon original intent allows 
judges to rely upon a standard which surpasses their own opinion. 
 Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent in Lee v. Weisman demonstrates how an 
originalist rationale was employed to reach a conclusion in an Establishment Clause 
case.114  Scalia demonstrates the importance of relying upon a foundation that supersedes 
the changing philosophies of judges.115  He states, "Today's opinion shows more 
forcefully than volumes of argumentation why our Nation's protection, that fortress 
which is our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the changeable philosophical 
predilections of the Justices of this Court, but must have deep foundations in the historic 
practices of our people."116  Scalia's also cites Justice Brennan's concurrence in School 
Dist. of Abington v. Schempp stating, "The line we must draw between the permissible 
and the impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the 
understanding of the Founding Fathers."117  In order to reach such a conclusion, Scalia 
considers the original purpose of the Establishment Clause, citing early cases that 
demonstrate the founders' opinions on its purpose.  In reaching his conclusion, Scalia 
argues: 
Thus, while I have no quarrel with the Court's general proposition that the 
Establishment Clause 'guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to 
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support or participate in religion or its exercise,'118 I see no warrant for expanding 
the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty -- a brand of 
coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to those of us who have made a 
career of reading the disciples of Blackstone rather than of Freud.  The Framers 
were indeed opposed to coercion of religious worship by the National 
Government; but, as their own sponsorship of nonsectarian prayer in public events 
demonstrates, they understood that 'speech is not coercive; the listener may do as 
he likes.'119  
 
Scalia bases his reasoning upon the original intent of the drafters of the Establishment 
Clause.  In determining the founders' intentions, he consults the Constitution itself, the 
Declaration of Independence, as well as early writings and cases that interpreted the 
Establishment Clause.120  While consulting the original intent is not without its faults, at 
the very minimum, it provides an interpretive foundation for judicial decision-making. 
 Establishment Clause decisions that ignore the original intent of the Constitution 
often reach conclusions diametrically opposed to the framers' original purpose for the 
Establishment Clause.  Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lee v. Weisman 
demonstrates this very problem, as his conclusion opposed the very purpose for which 
that provision was written:  
The lessons of the First Amendment are as urgent in the modern world as in the 
18th century when it was written.  One timeless lesson is that if citizens are 
subjected to state-sponsored religious exercises, the State disavows its own duty 
to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief which is the 
mark of a free people.  To compromise that principle today would be to deny our 
own tradition and forfeit our standing to urge others to secure the protections of 
that tradition for themselves.121 
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Though he appears to rely upon a long-standing historical tradition, this is simply not the 
case.   
 In 1864, Mr. Meacham, of the House Committee on the Judiciary, made the 
following pronouncement: "What is an establishment of religion?  It must have a creed, 
defining what a man must believe; it must have ministers of defined qualifications, to 
teach the doctrines and administer the rites; it must have tests for the submissive and 
penalties for the non-conformist.  There never was an established religion without all 
these . . ."122  While this is a rather narrow view of the Establishment Clause, even a 
broader view allowed numerous religious "activities" to continue.123  The early broader 
view of the Establishment Clause simply required government impartiality concerning 
religion.124  Kennedy's conclusion that a constitutional provision written to prevent 
Congress from establishing a religion, and more broadly, from favoring one religion over 
another prevents a non-sectarian prayer from being offered at a public high-school 
graduation ceremony is without merit.  Kennedy may reach this conclusion based upon 
prior precedent,125 or upon the evolving standards of society, but not upon original intent. 
 The contradictory decisions reached by the Supreme Court speak to the need for a 
consistent standard of interpretation.  Rule of law depends upon the ability of citizens to 
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know and understand the laws that govern them.126  As the Supreme Court's decisions 
increasingly create new law rather than interpret a stable, established law that individuals 
can understand and follow, the people of the United States of America are moving further 
away from the protection afforded by the rule of law. 
Analysis 
 The Constitution of the United States is so cherished for its ability to protect 
against the tyrannical rule of men; yet, if it is built upon nothing more than subjective 
opinions of that law, those opinions will supersede the Constitution itself.  Supreme 
Court Justice Antonin Scalia stated in an interview to NPR news:  
If you somehow adopt a philosophy that the Constitution itself is not static, but 
rather it morphs from age to age to say whatever it ought to say — which is 
probably whatever the people would want it to say — you eliminate the whole 
purpose of a Constitution. And that is essentially what the so-called living 
Constitution leaves you with.
127
   
 
This paper suggests that judges should treat the Constitution as a written document with 
fixed meaning.  Judicial review and other critical Supreme Court doctrines should find 
their authority in the "writtenness" of the Constitution:  
The Constitution is, among other things, a legal document, and it is on the 
Constitution's status as written law that justification of the practice of judicial 
review has largely rested. As Edwin Corwin once wrote, 'The first and most 
obvious fact about the Constitution of the United States is that it is a document.'  
Justice Black began his lectures on constitutional interpretation by saying, 'It is of 
paramount importance to me that our country has a written constitution.'  With 
words like these, contemporary constitutional interpreters hark back to John 
Marshall's original argument for judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, an 
argument permeated with reliance on the 'writtenness' of the Constitution.
128
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As a letter written to a friend contains words with specific meanings organized to 
articulate a specific message, so the Constitution contains words carefully chosen to 
convey a particular meaning. 
 The emphasis upon the Constitution as a written document lends much support to 
the interpretive approach of originalism.  While recognizing certain difficulties that arise 
with utilizing this interpretive method, this paper suggests that originalism provides the 
clearest lens through which to read the Constitution.  Furthermore, in consideration of the 
history of constitutional interpretation, it is clear that the initial idea of constitutional 
interpretation included a consideration of the intention of the framers of the Constitution.   
 Finally, the current difficulties created by the Supreme Court's reliance upon 
numerous alternative interpretive, or noninterpretive, methods of adjudication illustrate 
the need for a consistent standard of interpretation to ensure the Constitution continues to 
maintain its place as the supreme law of the land.  Attorney General Edwin Meese stated, 
regarding the current shift in constitutional interpretation: 
It was not so long ago when constitutional interpretation was understood to move 
between roles of 'strict construction' and 'loose construction.'  Today, it is argued 
that constitutional interpretation moves between 'interpretive review' and 'non-
interpretive review.'  As one observer has pointed out, under the old system the 
question was how to read the Constitution; under the new approach, the question 
is whether to read the Constitution.  The result is that some judges and academics 
feel free to roam at large in the trackless fields of their own imaginations.
129
 
 
Without a consistent meaning, the Constitution becomes whatever the judges say it is.  
Such construction of the Supreme Law of the Land renders the Constitution meaningless 
and erodes the stability the Constitution was intended to provide. 
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Conclusion 
 In view of the history of the American judicial system and the current difficulties 
created by the Supreme Court's shift away from considering the original intent of the 
Constitution, this paper suggests that the only solution is to abandon the relativism of a 
"living Constitution" and to consider once again the original intent of the Constitution's 
framers.  What began as an experiment in written constitutionalism has become a 
standard for nations throughout the world today.  In order to preserve the unique 
American constitutional order and system, this paper urges America's courts to return to 
an objective standard of interpretation when deciding cases.  In Lewis Carroll's Through 
the Looking Glass, Humpty Dumpty has a conversation with Alice where the meaning of 
words is purely subjective, "'When I use a word, 'Humpty Dumpty said in rather a 
scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less.'  'The 
question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.'"130  
Will America’s courts continue to follow the precedent set by Humpty Dumpty, or will 
they instead return to considering the objective meaning of the Constitution? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
130
 Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There 132 (1893). 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION                                                                      36 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ABA Division for Public Education, Part 1: What is the Rule of Law 4. 
Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and The "Living 
Constitution," 76 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1456, 1457. 
Alan Brownstein, The Reasons Why Originalism Provides a Weak Foundation for 
Interpreting Constitutional Provisions Relating to Religion, 2009 Cardozo L. Rev. 
De Novo 196, 216 (2009). 
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78: The Judiciary (1788), 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa78.htm  
Allegheny v. ACLU, 106 L. Ed. 2d 472, 475 (1989). 
American Jewish Congress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 132 (1987). 
1 Annals of Cong. 914 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
Antonin Scalia, Review of Steven D. Smith's Law's Quandary, 55 Cath. U.L. Rev. 687, 
692-3 (2006). 
________, Scalia Defends Originalism as Best Methodology for Judging Law (April 30, 
2010), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2010_spr/scalia.htm  
________, quoted in Ari Shapiro, Conservatives Have 'Originalism'; Liberals Have ... ? 
(2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105439966. 
Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 10 (1921). 
B.F. Morris, The Christian Life and Character of the Civil Institutions of the United 
States 317 (1864). 
Bogden v. Doty, 598 F. 2d 1110 (1979). 
Charles Evans Hughes, Speech at Elmira on May 3, 1907, in The Autobiographical Notes 
of Charles Evans Hughes 144 (1973). 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 432 (1793). 
Christopher N. May & Allan Ides, Constitutional Law National Power and Federalism: 
Examples And Explanations 36 (2007). 
Church of the Holy Trinity v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Judgment Calls: Principles and Politics in 
Constitutional Law 28 (2009). 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION                                                                      37 
 
David Barton, Original Intent: The Courts, the Constitution, & Religion 21 (1996). 
________, The Myth of Separation 16 (1991). 
Edward Sidlow & Beth Henschen, America at Odds 337 (2007). 
Edwin Meese, III, Address to American Bar Association (1985) quoted in, John Eidsmoe, 
Christianity and the Constitution 398 (1987). 
Elisha Williams, (1744) quoted in Religion and the Constitution 47 (Michael W. 
McConnell, John H. Garvey, Thomas C. Berg eds., 2002). 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962). 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
Gary L. McDowell, Interpretivism and Noninterpretivsm, in The Oxford Companion to 
the Supreme Court of the United States 436, 437 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992). 
Gottfried Dietze, In Defense of Property 258 (1995). 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
Holly Pietrzak, Updated: Ten Commandments Goes Back up in Giles County Schools, 
WDBJ7.com, January 21, 2001, ¶ 20, http://www.wdbj7.com/news/wdbj-
removal-of-the-ten-commandment-01202011,0,6946882.story. 
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments (1785), 
quoted in, The American Constitutional Experience: Selected Readings and Supreme Court 
Opinions 150 (James A. Curry, Richard B. Riley, Richard M Battistoni & John C. Blakeman eds., 
2000). 
James Madison, The Federalist No. 51 319-20 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
James McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice: An Introduction to the Constitutional 
Principles of American Government 33 (2000). 
John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 34 (1927). 
Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution 122 (2nd ed., 1836). 
John Witte Jr., Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment 185 (2005). 
Keith Whittington, How to Read the Constitution: Self-Government and the 
Jurisprudence of Originalism (2006), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/how-to-read-the-constitution-
self-government-and-the-jurisprudence-of-originalism. 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION                                                                      38 
 
Lee v. Weisman, 120 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1992). 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There 132 (1893). 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 669-70 (1985). 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
Martin Edelman, Issues Facing The Judiciary: Written Constitutions, Democracy And 
Judicial Interpretation: The Hobgoblin Of Judicial Activism, 68 Alb. L. Rev. 585, 
586 (2005). 
Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 593, 596 
(1999); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 
11-12 (1998). 
Michael J. Perry,The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the 
Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary 11 (1982). 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881). 
________, The Law in Science--Science in Law, in Collected Legal Papers 225, 225 
(1920). 
Otis H. Stevens, Jr. & John M. Scheb II, American Constitutional Law: Sources of Power 
and Restraint 48-9 (2008). 
Phillip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution, 94 (3) Ethics 501, 502 
(1984). 
Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 5 (1996). 
Richard B. Saphire, Making Noninterpretivism Respectable: Michael J. Perry's 
Contributions to Constitutional Theory, 81 (4) Mich. Law Rev. 782, 785 (1983). 
Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 Wm. & Mary 
Bill Rts. J. 73, 79 (2005). 
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 144 
(1990). 
Robert Justin Lipkin, Constitutional Revolutions: Pragmatism and the Role of Judicial 
Review in American Constitutionalism 126-7 (2000). 
Robert K. Dorman & Csaba Vedlick Jr., Judicial Supremacy: The Supreme Court on 
Trial 10 (1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION                                                                      39 
 
Robin L. West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About The Law-
As-Literature Movement, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 203, 205 (1986). 
R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and 
Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 25 Pepp. L. Rev. 37, 57 
(1997). 
School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963). 
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957). 
Sophie W. Littlefield & William M. Wiecek, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.: The Supreme 
Court and American Legal Thought 5 (2005). 
State Board of Education v. Board of Education of Netcong, 262 A. 2d 21 (Sup. Ct. NJ 
1970). 
Steven D. Smith, What Does Constitutional Interpretation Interpret? in Expounding the 
Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory 21, 32 (Grant Huscroft ed., 2008). 
Steven G. Calabresi, Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate 152 (2007).  
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980). 
Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1984). 
Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Wilson C. Nicholas, in Thomas Jefferson: Letters and 
Addresses 154, 154 (William B. Parker and Jonas Viles eds., 1908). 
Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Being his Autobiography, 
Correspondence, Reports, Messages, Addresses, And Other Writings, Official and 
Private 400 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854). 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
U.S. Const. Amend. 1. 
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691-2 (2005). 
William Anderson, The Intention of the Framers: A Note on Constitutional Interpretation, 
Vol, 49, No. 2 The American Political Science Review 340, 342 (1955). 
William Blackstone, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England 61 (1765), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_intro.asp#1. 
William Schofield, Christopher Columbus Langdell, 55 The American Law Register 273, 
273, 278. 
